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Abstract
This paper examines whether there necessarily exists a con￿ ict between allocative and pro-
ductive e¢ ciency in small open economy markets. That productive e¢ ciency favours market
concentration is not in dispute, and the sole question we face is whether allocative e¢ ciency
su⁄ers under high market concentration. We proceed theoretically and econometrically. We
￿nd that the con￿ ict between productive and allocative e¢ ciency is not necessarily as stringent
as the international competition policy literature suggests should be the case. In particular,
we note that the strategic interaction between the large domestic producer and its competi-
tors makes feasible a range of alternative price elasticities of demand, and empirically that all
price elasticities of demand are less than or equal to unity. Nevertheless the impact of market
structure is such as to render feasible a wide range of possible levels of pricing power.
Keywords: Price elasticities, market power, emerging markets, South Africa
JEL Classi￿cation: D43, L11, L72
1 Introduction
In small open economies, economies of scale in production may imply that e¢ cient domestic pro-
duction precludes the presence of more than one or at best a few domestic producers. Policy makers
in these circumstances face the dilemma that e¢ ciency of production, and competitive pricing ap-
pear to stand in some degree of tension with one another. The single (or few) domestic producer(s)
may appear to have the ability to set the domestic price, and earn monopoly rents. Yet e¢ ciency
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1considerations in production preclude anti-trust intervention resulting in smaller units of domes-
tic production. Allocative and productive e¢ ciency appear to be mutually exclusive, and policy
makers are forced to confront the trade o⁄ between the two.
Productive e¢ ciency as a function of scale of operation due to for instance specialization of
capital stock, impacts of setup and downtime costs, and of "learning-by-doing" e⁄ects are well doc-
umented in the literature.1 Conversely, losses in allocative e¢ ciency due to market concentration
through non-competitive pricing, X-ine¢ ciency and potential rent-seeking are of course founda-
tional to any microeconomic analysis of market structure.2 This con￿ ict has long been recognized
in the context of small open economies such as Australia,3 Canada (Kemani, 1991), and New
Zealand (Evans and Hughes, 2003), though in other small and developing country contexts the
con￿ ict appears to be less fully understood as a⁄ecting competition policy.4 The inference drawn
for policy purposes has been that competition per se has no longer been regarded as necessarily
welfare enhancing in small open economies. Instead, it has been argued that focusing on market
structure and market concentration is misleading, and that productive e¢ ciency considerations
should be the primary, perhaps sole focus of competition policy.5
This paper examines whether this apparent con￿ ict between allocative and productive e¢ ciency
necessarily follows. To do so, we examine evidence from a speci￿c market in an emerging economy
context, the petrochemicals derived plastics market in South Africa.6 Choice of this particular
market is dictated by a number of considerations. First, economies of scale in production and/or
lumpiness and sunkness of investment costs are such that the domestic market comes to be largely
1See for instance the discussion in Fuss and Gupta (1981) on the former, and Arrow (1962) Caves (1975) and
Romer (1986) on "learning-by-doing."
2Recent contributions have further identi￿ed the possibility that high levels of industry concentration negatively
a⁄ects the rate of productivity growth (See Aghion et al, 2004, 2006).
3See for instance the discussion in Caves (1984).
4Gal (2001) points to the case of Israel. In South Africa focus has increasingly been on the question of allocative,
rather than productive e¢ ciency. Thus focus has shifted increasingly to the impact of pricing strategies of upstream
￿rms on downstream industrial development.
5See for example Singh and Dhumale (1999) and Hoekman (1997). Thus for instance:
Small economies should .... strive to serve only one master, economic e¢ ciency, because they are less
able than their larger counterparts to a⁄ord competition policy that sacri￿ces economic e¢ ciency to
broader objectives. where social goals con￿ ict with economic e¢ ciency, both goals cannot be materially
promoted. Undeviating pursuit of wealth dispersion and small size of ￿rms at the expense of e¢ ciency
will be costly in small economies, due to the fact that ine¢ cienct ￿rms will be preserved in the market.
.... Moreover, the importance of economic e¢ ciency as a stand-alone objective is highlighted in small
economies where interdependencies in the interests of various stakeholders are likely to be more signif-
icantly a⁄ected by a particular market transaction. this reality increases the probability of lobbying,
rent seeking behavior, and political poturing aimed at the safeguarding or pursuing other objectives
promoted by public bene￿t or pubvic interest criteria. (Gal, 2001:1436-7.)
6Note that both Fedderke and Szalontai (2005) and Fedderke and Naumann (2005) point to high and pervasive
levels of industry concentration in all South African manufacturing sectors. Fedderke et al (2006) note that this
translates into signi￿cant mark-ups of price over marginal cost of production. The evidence is consistent with the
potential of con￿ ict between productive and allocative e¢ ciency with which this paper began.
2supplied by a single producer - though varying degrees of competition from imports and domestic
producers are also present. Second, the petrochemicals derived plastics market falls into four
distinct product groupings, characterized by quite distinct market structure, ranging from the
virtual absence of alternative suppliers in the domestic market (import or domestic), to substantial
import competition, to a market structure that appears at ￿rst sight to be a classic duopoly form.
Consideration of the impact and signi￿cance of market structure on ￿rm behaviour, on pricing,
and on the level of pricing power present in the market was thus feasible under quite distinct
circumstances. Third, the large domestic producer kindly provided access to its market data,
allowing for, to our knowledge, unprecedented micro-level evidence on market structure, pricing
behaviour, and by inference the degree of pricing power present in the various markets.
The speci￿city of market information, as well as the distinct circumstances that prevail across
the various petrochemicals derived plastics markets, allows us to be not only precise in our theo-
retical characterization of the markets, but by inference to be far more precise in the identi￿cation
strategy that we pursue in the empirical section of the paper in order to isolate the extent of market
power that is held by the large domestic producer. The strategy of the paper is straightforward. We
begin with a characterization of the four distinct markets examined in this paper. This allows us to
accept as the starting point of analysis that economies of scale and/or lumpiness and sunkness of
investment costs do restrict the number of domestic producers to a (very) small number. The real
question of the paper is then simply whether the large domestic producer realizes pricing power,
under circumstances under which we would normally presume that such power follows (the large
domestic producer has large market share).
The problem is addressed sequentially. First, we characterize the price elasticities and Lerner
indices that prevails in the four markets theoretically, and then estimate the price elasticities
empirically. Second, we draw the relevant inferences concerning pricing power from estimated price
elasticities. We note explicitly that the theoretical modelling of the paper proceeds under the
assumption of maximally favorable conditions for the large domestic producer. In particular, the
market structure noted below, as well as the fact that the historically large domestic producer is
the largest producer in all four petrochemicals derived plastics markets, is assumed to render it the
Stackelberg leader in all four markets.
To preempt our results, we ￿nd that the con￿ ict between productive and allocative e¢ ciency is
not necessarily as stringent as the international competition policy literature suggests should be the
case. In particular, we note that the strategic interaction between the large domestic producer and
its competitors makes feasible a range of alternative price elasticities of demand. Empirically, in the
South African markets we ￿nd that all price elasticities of demand are less than or equal to unity (in
absolute terms). While low price elasticities in general imply the presence of pricing power, we note
that the impact of market structure in these four markets is such as to render feasible a wide range
of possible levels of pricing power. It follows that the con￿ ict between productive and allocative
3e¢ ciency is not only not a necessary feature of small open economies, but this is so because high
degrees of market concentration and low price elasticities of demand do not necessarily translate
into pricing power.
We proceed as follows. In section 2 we provide a description of the features of the four petro-
chemicals based plastics markets that form the basis of our analysis. Section 3 outlines the theoret-
ical considerations relevant to our question, with section 3.1 exploring the implications of market
structure for the feasible ranges of the price elasticity of demand, and section 3.2 investigating the
resultant pricing power that emerges for producers in the markets. Section 4 presents the empirical
evidence, with section 4.3 exploring price elasticities. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Characterizing the Petrochemicals Derived Plastics Market in
South Africa
Both supply and demand conditions for the petrochemicals markets faced in South Africa have
peculiarities crucial to any accurate modelling of its markets. Our concern is with four petro-
chemicals derived plastics products, low density polyethylene (henceforth LDPE), linear low den-
sity polyethylene (henceforth LLDPE), poly(vinyl chloride) (henceforth PVC) and polypropylene
(henceforth PP).
On the supply side, production in petrochemical derived plastics, is characterized by production
costs that are dominated by costs that are e⁄ectively ￿xed rather than variable - in the sense that
the producer has little discretion over them once production capacity is set. The reason for this
is a combination of the substantially lumpy nature of production capacity, and the fact that the
ethylene that is the principal input into and cost associated with the various plastics production
processes, is a by-product arising from fuel production - if not utilized in the production of the
four plastics here considered, the ethylene has to be ￿ ared and is permanently lost.7 The plant size
adopted by the producer thus determines the capacity of the producer to absorb ethylene input into
production. Since the producer has an incentive to utilize all available ethylene given the prospect
of its permanent loss, once the plant size is chosen, this e⁄ectively sets a cost faced by the producer
that is invariant over time. Other inputs into the production plant (including labour costs), are
negligible. Plant size is discrete, such that production cost rises discontinuously, as new production
7In principle the by-product could be converted to fuel - but only under considerable additional capital investment.
4capacity is brought online.8 Thus we have:
ci (q) = ci; for qi￿1 ￿ q ￿ qi; ci > ci￿1 (1)
where an overbar denotes a constant, c production cost, and q output. By contrast, the revenue
structure of the market is standard, viz, the revenue function is concave in output. However, if the
large domestic producer also export some of its output, the revenue function is then not smooth at
the point where the ￿rm switches to the export market.
This cost and revenue structure is illustrated in Figure 1.
"Insert Figure 1 about here."
All four of the product markets above have a large domestic producer, though the market share
of the domestic producer di⁄ers markedly across the four products. The large domestic producer￿ s
market share and share from domestic production, is contrasted with the market share from import
competitors and domestic competitors. This is depicted in Figure 2 for the period January 1994
to June 2005 at monthly frequency. While the large domestic producer held substantial market
share in LDPE, LLDPE and PVC, and to a lesser extent in PP markets, the markets have remained
contestable at least to import penetration throughout the sample period, and to signi￿cant domestic
competition in the case of the PP market.
On the basis of this evidence, the four markets fall into three distinct categories. In the PVC
market, entry (by domestic ￿rms or foreign ￿rms) has not been successful and the large domestic
producer is by and large a monopoly. The markets for LDPE and LLDPE have seen relatively
strong, and in the case of LLDPE steadily growing import competition. Finally, the most contested
market is that of PP, in which the large domestic producer has historically held the largest market
share, but not by an overwhelming margin, and in the most recent time periods has lost the
dominant market position to its domestic competitor. From Figure 2 below, we can see that for
LDPE, LLDPE, and PVC, all competition was imported.
For the PP market, domestic production is the most prominent form of competition in the
market. There exist two domestic producers, with approximately equal market share. The PP
market in South Africa has the additional feature that the inputs into PP production employed
by the domestic competitor to the historically large producer, are purchased from the latter. The
price of the inputs are set as a proportion of the average price that prevails for PP in the domestic
8There is reason to suppose that for the PP market the assumption of
@c
@q ! 0, employed for the other three
markets, may not be as relevant. This is since PP can be converted to petrol fuel, introducing an opportunity cost
dimension to the use of PP in plastics markets. Hence in this instance
@c
@q 6= 0, may be appropriate. Note that in
principle the possibility of fuel conversion applies in all four markets. However, the conversion possibility is easiest
(least costly) in PP production, such that
@c
@q 6= 0 may be most appropriate for this market. Nevertheless, the
distinction between the markets is one of degree, rather than type.
5market, where the proportion is determined by prevailing conditions on international petrochemicals
markets.
"Insert Figure 2 about here."
The possibility of foreign entry into domestic markets, raises the converse implication that under
appropriate conditions, domestic producers may also ￿nd it pro￿table to export. Thus at any given
time point the domestic producer faces an in￿nite international demand at pf ￿ (￿f + ￿), that is
foreign price, pf, adjusted for foreign tari⁄s, ￿f, and transport costs, ￿. Given the cost structure
of production in the petrochemicals sector, the inference would be that at any time point, there
will exist a maximal domestic supply capacity, qmax, given by domestic production capacity. Hence
domestic demand may either exceed, or fall short of maximal domestic supply. Whenever domestic
supply exceeds domestic demand, ideally the ￿rm would want to export the excess output in order
not to put pressure on the domestic price. The ￿rm will use the export market to o⁄-load excess
output provided pf￿(￿f + ￿) ￿ b c; where b c denotes variable cost of production. That is, the revenue
generated from the export market at least cover variable costs. Generally, in order for exports to
become a more pro￿table alternative to production for the domestic market, a necessary condition
is that pf > p.9
3 Theoretical Background
This section is concerned primarily with the supply side of the markets, since we treat the demand
side as standard. Our interest in this section is in modelling the domestic market, with a view to
derive testable implications in respect of the market/ pricing power exercisable by the dominant
(HLDP) domestic producer.




p(q) if the domestic producer is a monopoly
p(q + qi) if there is a competitor in the market
; (2)
where q denotes the output of the historically large domestic producer and qi is the output of the
competitor ￿rm; i = m if import competitor and i = d if domestic competitor.
Assumptions
We make the following assumptions:
Assumption 1: @p(Q)=@Q ￿ 0: This assumption is standard. We assume that the demand curve
is downward sloping (possibly with some ￿ at sections). Thus, other things being equal, as
the market output increases, price cannot increase.
9A su¢ cient condition for the greater pro￿tability of exports over production for the domestic market is that
pf ￿ (￿f + ￿) > p. However, as we will see below, this possibility is ruled out in the present paper.
6Assumption 2: c00 (q) ￿ 0: That is, marginal costs are either constant or increasing. We never
have decreasing marginal costs.
Assumption 3: pf ￿ (￿f + ￿) < p: This assumption says that the historically large domestic
producer will never ￿nd it pro￿table to ￿ completely￿abandon the domestic market in any
period. In other words, the HLDP will always supply a positive quantity to the domestic
market.10
3.1 The Supply Side of the Market
On the supply side, we distinguish three types of market. This is in order to cover theoretically
that there may be important di⁄erences between the market for PVC, where entry has not been
successful, the markets for LDPE and LLDPE, in which the competition in the market is primarily
from imports (of varying degree), and the market for PP for which there is a domestic competitor,
who purchases the input stock for production from the historically largest producer, and has a
market share that is close to parity with the large domestic producer.
We distinguish the ￿rst type of market by abstraction, such that competition to the domestic
producer is absent. In other markets, the large domestic producer faces a strategic game. In
the PP market, the domestic competitor relies on the historically large domestic producer for
its inputs. However, the latter is legally bound to supply those inputs, and the cost structure
under which those inputs are supplied is pre-determined by contractual agreement.11 While the
historically large domestic producer thus has the capacity to raise the cost of inputs of the domestic
competitor, these costs can equally be decreased by the domestic competitor. In addition, this
strategic opportunity is limited by the potential loss of signi￿cant market share by the historically
large domestic producer due to price increases in a homogeneous market. Instead, the source of
domestic strategic bargaining power by the historically large domestic producer arises due to its
signi￿cant market presence in a range of plastics and other markets domestically, which renders it
the dominant player in any potential price war contest. In the LDPE, LLDPE and PVC markets,
the large domestic producer has strategic advantage by virtue of the transport cost and tari⁄
barriers that the import competitors face.
Analysis therefore proceeds on the assumption that the dominant domestic producer is the
leader in the four markets, with the competitors only making their choices after observing the
leader￿ s choice. Structure of the game is thus Stackelberg. In this paper, we model ￿rms as
competing on quantities. Our characterization of the markets, in particular with regard to the
competition variables, is consistent with a new departure in the literature. For instance, Puu
10In fact we take the view in this paper that, in so far as the domestic producer is concerned, exports are "a vent
for surplus".
11The input costs are determined both by the historically large domestic producer￿ s and by its domestic competitor￿ s
pricing decisions in the output market, by means of an averaging formula.
7and Norin (2003) study the dynamics in a Cournot duopoly with capacity constraints; Laye and
Laye (2007), characterize the Cournot-Nash equilibrium in a multi-market Cournot model when
￿rms face capacity constraints while Wu J et al (2007) examine information sharing in a Cournot
duopoly with capacity constraints. Also, our modeling of ￿rms as competing on quantities (rather
than prices) is consistent with the information provided by market participants in the South African
petrochemicals market.12
3.1.1 The Supply Side under Non-variable Input Costs and Limited Competition






ci (q) = ci; for qi￿1 ￿ q ￿ qi; ci > ci￿1
where ￿ denotes pro￿t. The HLDP is free to export, provided it is pro￿table to do so. The ￿rst











= pf ￿ (￿f + ￿) if q > e q (4)
where e q is the output level for which the marginal revenue from domestic sales, MRd (=
@(p(q)q)
@q )
equals the marginal revenue from exports, MRE (= pf ￿ (￿f + ￿)): If the capacity is low (q ￿ e q),
the domestic producer will not export and will, in equilibrium, equate marginal revenue to marginal
cost. If instead the capacity is high (q > e q) and pf ￿ (￿f + ￿) ￿ b c; then the ￿rm equates marginal
revenue from domestic sales to the marginal revenue from exports. We assume that the foreign
price, pf is beyond the control of the domestic producer, that is, the domestic producer is relatively
small in the international market. Since @c=@q ! 0 for the PVC market, we summarize the above
in the following:
12Discussions with the historically large domestic producer in particular indicate that ￿rms in the petrochemicals
market in South Africa tend to use quantities (and not prices) as strategic variables. They contend that demand
in the petrochemicals market in South Africa is unresponsive to (small) price changes. This, to some extent, is
corroborated by our empirical ￿ndings of low demand elasticities.
13The revenue function is (potentially) non-di⁄erentaible at q = e q; where e q is the output for which marginal revenue
from domestic sales equals the marginal revenue from exports. It should be noted that e q is not guaranteed to exist a
priori. If the foreign prices are too low, the ￿rm may choose not to export, in which case e q does not exist (all output
supplied to the domestic market). If the ￿rm does export, then the revenue function is discontinuous at q = e q and
thus is non-di⁄erentiable at this point (the function is piecewise di⁄erentiable).
8Proposition 1 In equilibrium, the (monopoly) domestic producer produces at a point where de-
mand elasticity ("q;p) equals unity if it has low capacity (q ￿ e q) and hence does not export but




> 1 if it has a large capacity (q > e q) and exports.
Proof. Follows immediately from (3) and (4).
3.1.2 The Supply Side under Import Competition
Consider the general case, in which @c=@q 6= 0. In this instance we have two producers in the
market, the HLDP and an import competitor. The import competitor has limited power to change
domestic market conditions, being forced to land its product subject to tari⁄ and transport costs,
such that if domestic price is too low, the import supply will be switched to market destinations
other than the domestic. The domestic ￿rm chooses its quantity ￿rst and the import competitor
(foreign ￿rm) observes the output choice of the domestic ￿rm before making its own choice.14
The import competitor chooses qm to solve15:
￿m = max
qm
fp(Q)qm ￿ cm (qm) ￿ (￿ + ￿)qmg ￿ F; (5)
where cm (qm) is the import competitor￿ s production cost for output qm and ￿ + ￿ is the landed
cost (tari⁄s plus transport costs) per unit output while F is a ￿xed cost. The import competitor￿ s
best reply for each output level q of the domestic producer, qm (q); is given by:16
qm (q) =
p(q + qm (q)) ￿ (￿ + ￿ + c0
m (qm (q)))
jp0 (q + qm (q))j
(6)
The implications are immediately intuitive, with @qm=@p > 0, such that higher domestic
prices trigger higher imports, @qm=@￿ < 0, such that higher tari⁄ structures discourage imports,
@qm=@￿ < 0, such that higher transport costs discourage imports, @qm=@ (@cm=@qm) < 0, such that
a higher marginal cost of production of imports discourages imports, and @qm=@ (j@p=@qmj) < 0,
such that a higher price elasticity of demand to import penetration discourages imports.













m + [￿ + ￿ + c0
m ￿ p]p00 (7)
14We suppose here that both ￿rms have market power. An alternative formulation would be to treat the import
competitor as a fringe ￿rm, producing according to its competitive supply. In this case, the import competitor would
be a price taker.
15We normalize the exchange rate to unity.
16Su¢ cient conditions for concavity of the objective function, ￿m, are that c
00
m ￿ 0 (convex cost function) and
p
00 ￿ 0 (concave inverse demand function).
9Observe that for convex demand the second order condition for a pro￿t maximum is met only if E ￿
(2 ￿ c00
m=p0)=msimc, where E ￿ ￿Qp00=p0 is the degree of curvature of the inverse demand function
and msimc ￿ qm=Q is the market share of the import competitor.17 The import competitor￿ s
reaction function is upward sloping (@qm=@q > 0) if and only if E > 1=msimc:18 Hence, for E 2
(1;2 ￿ c00
m=p0) 1
msimc; @qm=@q > 0.
Consider next the leader￿ s behaviour. For each output level that the domestic producer picks,
she anticipates that a pro￿t maximizing import competitor will choose qm (q): The leader￿ s problem
is thus:
￿dimc = max
q fp(q + qm (q))q ￿ c(q)g ￿ F: (8)
As before, we allow for the possibility of exporting by the domestic producer. This modi￿es the

























From equations (9) and (10), we can derive (implicitly) the domestic producer￿ s equilibrium
outputs. In particular,






m￿p]p00 and msdimc ￿ q￿=Q be the market share of the
domestic producer. The pro￿t maximizing behaviour of a nonexporting domestic producer facing















Proof. Follows directly from the ￿rst order conditions (9) and (10).
The parameter ￿ (= 1 + @qm=@q) can be interpreted as a measure of the domestic producer￿ s
conjectures about the import competitor (see Varian (1992: 302-303)).19 As was pointed out by
17The second order condition is met if and only if 2p
0 (Q) + qmp
00 (Q) ￿ c
00
m (qm) ￿ 0: Dividing through by p
0 (Q)




imc: Note that the second order condition being met does not imply p
00 ￿ 0:
Concavity of the inverse demand function is not necessary for pro￿ts to be concave in output.
18Follows immediately from (6) and (7). For our purposes, curvature is important only when demand is convex.
Thus, E is always positive.
19More precisely, it is the term, @qm=@q; that is referred to as the conjectural variation term.
10Svizzero (1997), the inverse demand￿ s degree of curvature determines the slope of the reaction
function (p. 155). For concave demand and convex costs, ￿ < 1 (implying the follower￿ s reaction
curve is downward sloping). However, for su¢ ciently convex demand (E 2 (1;2 ￿ c00
m=p0) 1
msimc),
￿ > 1. In other words, when demand is su¢ ciently convex, the domestic producer conjectures that
the import competitor will choose a higher qm in response to a higher output by itself.




for an exporting domestic producer. Hence, given
assumption 3, it follows that, for ￿ < 1 and msdimc not too high, "q;p < 1: In particular, if
￿msdimc < 1 ￿
pf￿(￿f+￿)
p ; then "q;p < 1: However, if ￿msdimc is large (￿msdimc > 1 ￿
pf￿(￿f+￿)
p ),
then "q;p > 1: We conclude that when the domestic producer is also an exporter, the demand
elasticity is (a priori) unrestricted. That is, "q;p Q 1: The same is true for a non-exporting domestic
producer (equation (11)). If ￿ ￿ 1; then ￿msdimc < 1 since msdimc 2 (0;1): In this case, the
elasticity of demand is unrestricted (i.e., "q;p Q 1). However, if @c=@q ! 0; then for ￿ ￿ 1; "q;p < 1:
If instead ￿ > 1 and su¢ ciently large, it is possible that ￿msdimc ￿ 1. In this case, "q;p > 1:20
Thus, without the exact values for ￿ and msdimc; we cannot pin down (theoretically) the demand
elasticity faced by the historically large domestic producer.21
Observe that reaction functions are downward sloping (outputs are strategic substitutes) if
E ￿ 1=msimc. In particular, if E = 1=msimc; then q￿ = q￿





That is, the Stackelberg and the Cournot quantities coincide (Colombo and Labrecciosa, 2004).
Clearly therefore, the curvature of the demand function fully characterizes the Stackelberg outputs.
In particular, it gives the smallest output level (for the leader) compatible with the Stackelberg
leadership game. Let qS
inf be the in￿mum of the set qS; where qS is the set of all rationalizable
outputs by the leader. Then, for identical marginal costs, qS
inf = qC; where qC is the Cournot
output.
3.1.3 The Supply Side under Domestic Competition
In this instance we again have two producers in the market, the historically large domestic producer
and a domestic competitor. The cost of input stock feed to the domestic competitor stands in a
￿xed proportion, 0 < ￿ < 1, to the PP price.22 For the sake of tractability, we assume a simple
engineering production function in the production of PP, such that the inputs into production stand
20However, this requires that the unit margin for the importer, p ￿ (￿ + ￿ + c
0
m) is quite large. This suggests that
" ￿ 1 is the most reasonable expectation.
21Expressing the HLDP￿ s conjectures (￿) as a function of the degree of curvature of the demand function, E; gives:











; and di⁄erentiating with respect to E gives @￿=@E > 0: Thus, the leader￿ s
output will be lower the more convex is the demand curve. This is intuitive. When demand is su¢ ciently convex,
the reaction functions are upward sloping implying that a higher output by the leader induces a higher output by
the follower which implies the resulting equilibrium price is much lower. As in the price leadership model, the leader
has to reduce its output to support a higher price.
22The precise proportion is determined by prevailing conditions on international petrochemicals markets, the details
of which are not immediately relevant to the decision problems of the two market participants.
11in relation ￿ to output generated.23 Under standard assumptions, we then have input costs for
the domestic competitor given by; c(qc) = ￿p(Q)￿qc, where qc denotes the output of the domestic
competitor ￿rm.
Since the domestic competitor relies on the inputs supplied by the HLDP, we model the HLDP
as the ￿rst mover (Stackelberg leader). The domestic competitor￿ s problem is thus
￿c = max
qc
fp(Q)qc ￿ ￿￿p(Q)qcg ￿ F = max
qc
(1 ￿ ￿￿)p(Q)qc ￿ F: (13)
Given c(qc) = ￿￿p(Q)qc; we have that @c(qc)=@qc = ￿￿[p(Q) + qcp0 (Q)]; where the term
in square brackets is the ￿rm￿ s marginal revenue. Clearly, marginal cost is everywhere below the
marginal revenue ￿ hence marginal cost and marginal revenue cannot intersect. The domestic
competitor is thus a revenue maximizer. In equilibrium it equates marginal revenue to zero.
The HLDP￿ s maximization problem is given by:24
￿ddc = max
q fp(q + qc (q))q ￿ c(q)g ￿ F: (14)





















= pf ￿ (￿f + ￿) ￿
@c(q)
@q
if q > e q (16)
To summarize,






and msddc be the market share of the domestic pro-
ducer facing domestic competition. A nonexporting domestic producer facing domestic competition
will produce such that
q￿ =









If instead the domestic producer is also an exporter, it￿ s equilibrium output is given by:
q￿ =
pf ￿ (￿f + ￿) ￿ p
￿p0 (Q)
: (18)
Proof. Follows directly from (15) and (16).
Observe that ￿ = 1 + @qc=@q: ￿ < 1 for concave (or not too convex) demand. That is, the
domestic competitor￿ s reaction curve is downward sloping (outputs are strategic substitutes). For
23The engineering relationship is such that ￿ ￿ 1. Thus one tonne of ethylene produces approximately one tonne
of polypropylene.
24The HLDP realises that for each output q that it chooses, the domestic competitor will produce qc (q):
12convex demand, we can express ￿ as a function of the degree of curvature of the inverse demand
function. This gives: ￿ = 1=(2 ￿ "q;p:E): The parameter ￿ is a measure of the HLDP￿ s conjectures
about the response of the domestic competitor to its output choices. When demand is su¢ ciently





; @￿=@E > 0:25 Thus, as the curvature of the demand function
increases (in the acceptable range for E), the optimal output of the domestic producer (HLDP)
decreases. Again the reason is that a lower output by the leader is necessary to support a higher
price.26
It is immediate from (17) and (18) that the domestic producer will supply more to the domestic
market in the absence of exports (pf ￿ (￿f + ￿) > c0 (q￿)). When the ￿rm exports, in equilibrium
the marginal revenue must be the same in the domestic and the export markets. However, the
marginal revenue from exports must exceed the marginal cost for the ￿rm to ￿nd it pro￿table to
export in the ￿rst place. This is intuitive and it points to the fact that exports are a diversion from
the domestic supply. One way to show this is to explicitly derive the HLDP￿ s market share in the










We see that the domestic ￿rm￿ s market share in the domestic market (msddc) is lower the
higher is the marginal revenue from exporting. This is intuitive. As it becomes more pro￿table to
export, the HLDP responds by diverting more of its output away from the domestic market and
to the foreign market. This raises the domestic competitor￿ s market share. We also see from (19)
that a decrease in the domestic price will lower the HLDP￿ s domestic market share, other things
being equal. This is because, other things being equal, a decrease in the domestic price raises the
attractiveness of exporting and the HLDP responds by reducing its supply to the domestic market
and diverting the output to the export market.
3.2 Implications for Market Structure and Competitiveness
One means of computing the pricing power within a market, is by means of the Lerner index for the
market. The index computes directly the ability of market participants to exercise market power











ensures that the second order condition is satis￿ed.





: It is easy to
see from this expression that "q;p Q 1: That is, the demand elasticity is unrestricted.
13the premium of price over the marginal cost of production as a ratio of price, at pro￿t maximizing








For South Africa￿ s four polymer markets, we can derive Lerner indices with respect to the
benchmark provided by the pricing power under monopoly conditions.
3.2.1 The Supply Side under Non-variable Input Costs and Limited Competition
From equations (3) and (4), the Lerner indices follow immediately, since @c=@q = 0, providing:
Proposition 4 Irrespective of whether the domestic producer is an exporter or a non-exporter,
the Lerner index under non-variable costs of production, and in the absence of either domestic or
import competition, is unity; that is, L =
p￿@c=@q
p = 1:
Proof. From (3), it can easily be shown that L =
p￿@c=@q
p = 1
"q;p = 1 (since @c=@q = 0). Similarly,





p = 1 (since @c=@q = 0).
Given the absence of competition, and under @c=@q ! 0, this thus provides an indication of
strong pricing power. For the PVC polymer market, the indication is thus that the best estimate
of the associated Lerner Index is 1, indicating the presence of pricing power.
3.2.2 The Supply Side under Import Competition
It is straight forward to compute the Lerner indices implied by (9) and (10). Manipulating the
equations we get that:
Proposition 5 The Lerner index for the domestic producer facing import competition (Ldimc) is
given by:




















pf ￿ (￿f + ￿) ￿ c0 (q￿)
p
(23)
when the domestic producer is also an exporter.28
27A monopoly ￿rm (facing positive marginal cost) always produces where demand is elastic.
28The term in square brackets is ￿:
14Proof. The proofs follow immediately from the ￿rst order conditions (9) and (10) together with
the de￿nition of the Lerner index.
The Lerner index for the domestic producer facing import competition thus depends on the
price elasticity of demand, "q;p, on the pricing power of the import competitor, Limc (or more
generally the domestic producer￿ s conjectures), and on the market share of the domestic producer.
In the case of an exporter, the foreign price, foreign tari⁄s and transportation costs also a⁄ect the
domestic producer￿ s market power in the domestic market.
The domestic producer￿ s market power increases with its market share but is inversely pro-
portional to the demand elasticity. An increase in market share raises the domestic producer￿ s
pricing power. This is because a higher market share nudges the ￿rm towards a monopoly position.
The curvature of the demand curve also a⁄ects the domestic producer￿ s market power. If demand
is concave, the domestic producer￿ s market power decreases with the import competitor￿ s market
power (products are strategic substitutes). However, if demand is convex, the domestic producer￿ s
market power increases with the import competitor￿ s market power. Put di⁄erently, the domestic
producer￿ s market power increases with the convexity of the inverse demand function. Note that
with su¢ ciently convex demand, reaction functions are upward sloping which makes the ￿rms￿
choice variables strategic complements.
We see from (22) and (23) that the Lerner index is higher when the domestic producer is also an
exporter. That is, the ability to export raises the domestic producer￿ s pricing power, other things
being equal. This is, to our knowledge, a novel result. The intuition is that the export market gives
the domestic producer a leeway to manipulate the domestic market.
The above discussion carries immediate implications for the magnitude of the pricing power of
the domestic producer. The general implication of the Lerner condition speci￿ed under (22), is
that pricing power of the domestic producer can be both greater than, or less than that of the pure
monopolist. Speci￿cally:
Proposition 6 Consider a nonexporting ￿rm. (i). A necessary condition for the domestic producer
facing import competition to have more pricing power than a pure monopolist is that the inverse
demand is su¢ ciently convex (i.e., E 2 (1;2 ￿ c00
m=p0) 1
msimc): (ii) A su¢ cient condition for the
domestic producer facing import competition to have less pricing power than a pure monopolist is
that reaction functions are downward sloping; that is, p00 (Q) ￿ 0:
Proof. (i) The Lerner Index for a monopoly ￿rm is: LM ￿
p￿c0(q)
p = 1
"q;p: Now, for Ldimc to exceed
LM; it su¢ ces that ￿msdimc > 1: However, since msdimc 2 (0;1); a necessary condition for Ldimc
to exceed LM is that ￿ > 1: Since ￿ = 1+@qm=@q; ￿ > 1 if and only if (7) is positive. As we showed
in the discussion immediately following equation (7), @qm=@q > 0 if and only if E > 1=msdimc:
However, if demand is too convex, E > (2 ￿ c00
m=p0) 1
msimc; the second order condition is violated.
Hence the claim.
15(ii) The second part of the proposition follows readily from the ￿rst part. If demand functions
are concave (p00 (Q) < 0), then reaction functions are downward sloping implying the products are
strategic substitutes. In this case, @qm=@q < 0 and hence ￿ < 1: But if ￿ < 1; then ￿msdimc < 1
since msdimc 2 (0;1): Thus, Ldimc = ￿msdimc
"q;p < 1
"q;p = LM: Hence concavity of the inverse demand
is su¢ cient.
As a corollary, a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the domestic producer facing import
competition to have more pricing power than a pure monopolist is that ￿msimc > 1:
3.2.3 The Supply Side under Domestic Competition
A simple manipulation of (15) and (16) gives the following proposition.

















pf ￿ (￿f + ￿) ￿ c0 (q￿)
p
(25)
when the domestic producer is also an exporter.
Proof. The proofs follow immediately from the ￿rst order conditions (15) and (16) together with
the de￿nition of the Lerner index.
The term in square brackets in (24) is ￿: We see that for a nonexporting domestic producer
facing domestic competition, pricing power is greater the higher the ￿rm￿ s market share and the
greater is the ￿rm￿ s conjecture about the reaction of the rival, ￿. The parameter ￿ is higher the
more convex is the demand. As we pointed out earlier, the ￿rm￿ s outputs are strategic complements
for su¢ ciently convex demand. In this case, the domestic producer (leader) can easily manipulate
the domestic competitor (follower) ￿which gives the leader more pricing power. For an exporting
domestic producer, the export market gives additional pricing power since it facilitates manipulation
of the domestic market.
4 Empirical and Estimation Results
4.1 The Data
Data at monthly frequency were obtained from the historically large domestic producer in South
Africa, for the LDPE, LLDPE, PVC and PP product lines. The sample period employed for the
16study was 1994:1 through 2005:6.29 For each product market, variables included:
1. The historically large domestic producer￿ s supply to the domestic market (tons); note that
this variable may include imports of the relevant product by the historically large domestic
producer in years where domestic demand exceeded domestic production; we employ the
variable in natural log transform; (variable denoted LQ);
2. The historically large domestic producer￿ s market share (proportion); (variable denoted Mk-
tShr);
3. Import duties on the product (percent); for PVC the variable incorporates anti-dumping over
the FOB Duty levied on imports; computation is by linear averaging across all prevailing
anti-dumping duties; (variable denoted Duties);
4. Capacity utilization;30 (variable denoted CU1);
5. Domestic price of the relevant product (R/ton); we employ the variable in natural log trans-
form; (variable denoted LPricept);
6. Total cost of inputs into production (R); we employ the variable in natural log transform;
(variable denoted LInputTot);
7. Exports of the relevant product; we employ the variable in natural log transform; (variable
denoted LExports);
8. Price per ton earned on Exports; we employ the variable in natural log transform; (variable
denoted LPExports);
9. Imports of the relevant product; we employ the variable in natural log transform; (variable
denoted LImports);
10. Price per ton of Imports; we employ the variable in natural log transform; (variable denoted
LPImports);
In addition we obtained monthly data for the level of aggregate economic activity from the
South African Reserve Bank:
29For the following variables the sample period was shorter: for LDPE, input costs were available only from 1997:7,
and export prices were available only from 2000:6; for LLDPE, prices of domestic output and of imports were available
only from 1996:7, input costs were available only from 1997:7, and export prices were available only from 2000:6; for
PVC, input costs were available only from 1997:7; for PP all variables were available from 1996:7.
30Capacity utilization is computed by a HLDP internal modelling exercise, which compares actual production with
full utilization of capital stock.
171. Leading Indicator of Economic Activity; we employ the variable in natural log transform;31
(variable denoted LIncome).
2. Urbanization rate (proportion of population urbanized); from the World Bank Development
indicators; data is annual; monthly data is generated by smoothed linear averaging interpo-
lation; (variable denoted Urban).
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistics are reported in Table1. We note that all variables are
￿rst di⁄erence stationary, with the following exceptions. The capacity utilization variables are
stationary in levels for all markets. For LDPE, the market share variable on ADF statistics reports
as level stationary. However, we note that in terms of both the spectrum and the autocorrelation
functions of the market share variable, stationarity is in doubt.32 In estimation for the LDPE
market, therefore, we estimate under the assumption that the market share is non-stationary.33
For LDPE exports and export prices are stationary in levels. For PVC, the market share, import
and import price variables all prove to be stationary in levels. For PP, duties show no variation at
all over the sample period, and hence are strictly stationary. Exports are also stationary in levels.
"Insert Table 1 about here."
4.2 The Estimation Methodology
4.2.1 The VECM Estimation Methodology
The expectations of long run relationships in non-stationary data suggests the appropriateness of
a VECM estimation framework. We employ that of Johansen.
Johansen34 techniques of estimation are now standard, so that the discussion here can be brief.
We employ a vector error-correction (VECM) framework, for which in the case of a set of k variables,
we may have cointegrating relationships denoted r, such that 0 ￿ r ￿ k ￿ 1. This gives us a k-
dimensional VAR:
zt = A1zt￿1 + ::: + Amzt￿m + ￿ + ￿t (26)
where m denotes lag length, ￿ deterministic elements, and ￿ a Gaussian error term. While in
general zt may contain I (0) elements, given our bivariate association, as long as non-stationary
variables are present we are exclusively restricted to I (1) elements. Reparameterization provides
31We employ the leading indicator rather than GDP since it was the only indicator of economic activity published
on a monthly basis by the SARB.
32Full results are available on request.
33However, we report the sensitivity of results to excluding the market share variable from the long run relationship,
and either excluding it from estimation entirely, or including it only in the stationary short run components of
estimation.
34See Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Juselius (1990, 1992). For full discussions of the statistical properties of





￿i￿zt￿i + ￿zt￿k+1 + ￿ + ￿t (27)
The existence of r cointegrating relationships amounts to the hypothesis that:
H1 (r) : ￿ = ￿￿0 (28)
where ￿ is p ￿ p, and ￿;￿ are p ￿ r matrices of full rank. H1 (r) is thus the hypothesis of reduced
rank of ￿. Where r > 1, issues of identi￿cation arise.35 In our case this may arise if more than one
long run relationship is present in the data.
Our prior discussion leads us to anticipate two possible cointegrating relationships, one for the
demand side and one for the supply side of the market.
The discussion of the demand and supply side of the market relevant to a case such as the
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(30)
Though the presumption of the presence of demand and supply relationships might lead us to
impose the weak exogeneity assumptions that ￿i1 = ￿2j = 0;i;j ￿ 3, we initially proceed in the
absence of any restrictions on the ￿-matrix.
4.3 Evidence on Price Elasticities
In this section we consider evidence on the price elasticity of demand for the four polymer markets
in South Africa.
In Table 2 we report results for the maximal eigenvalue test statistic on the number of coin-
tegrating relations in the system speci￿ed by equations (29&30).37 The test statistic con￿rms the
35See Wickens (1996), Johansen and Juselius (1990, 1992), Pesaran and Shin (1995a, 1995b), Pesaran, Shin and
Smith (1996).
36Although in the theoretical section of the paper we allow for nonlinearities in the demand functions (and hence
elasticities), local linearity is assumed in the estimations.
37We note that the trace statistic reports up to four cointegrating relations in the data. This may well be due to
19presence of two cointegrating relations for LDPE. In Model 1, reported in Table 3, we estimate
equations (29&30) for LDPE under the additional restriction that ￿29 = 0. We impose no weak
exogeneity conditions on the estimation. The model thus now incorporates the possibility that
variable costs are not material to the supply decision in the domestic market, as suggested in the
introduction, and as allowed for in the theoretical sections of the paper.
Results prove to be theoretically coherent. Speci￿cally, demand for LDPE responds negatively
to price with an elasticity of ￿0:33, con￿rming the anticipated j"q;pj < 1 under the @c=@q ! 0
condition outlined in the theoretical discussion of section 3.1.2. Further, demand responds positively
to income with an elasticity of 0:77. An increase in imports, results in demand growth. Thus rising
import competitiveness, generates a growth in domestic market size. However, the elasticity is
relatively small, at 0:06. Finally, demand responds positively to urbanization.
Supply responds positively to price with an elasticity of 0:99. Further, output supply responds
positively to an increase in the historically large domestic producer￿ s market share, and the impact
remains very strong in economic terms. A one percentage point increase in market share generates
an increase in market size of approximately 10%. Output supply also responds negatively to an
increase in import duties. That is, higher import duties induce the domestic ￿rm to restrict its
supply to the domestic market. Given the standard expectation that domestic producers will exploit
the increased market power that protection o⁄ers, by raising pro￿tability through price increases,
thereby restricting supply of output, this ￿nding is theoretically plausible.38 The magnitude of the
impact remains large, with a one percentage point decrease in duties increasing market size by ap-
proximately 22%. While the direction of the impact is thus plausible, its size is perhaps implausibly
large. Finally output supplied responds negatively to an increase in exports, with an elasticity of
￿0:11. Given the understanding of the drivers of the export decision in the petrochemicals markets,
as outlined in the introduction of the paper, and the arguments pro⁄ered in the theoretical section
of the paper, the expectation would be that exports are a diversion of part of the output intended
for the domestic market to foreign markets. The expectation would thus be of a negative relation
between exports and output supplied in the domestic market, as con￿rmed by the present ￿nding.
All coe¢ cients have theoretically plausible signs, though the magnitude of the impact of duties
and market share are potentially such as to render the coe¢ cients implausible. The price elastic-
ity of demand of ￿0:33 is below unity, as anticipated under the theoretical exposition of market
structure under @c=@q ! 0. The supply elasticity to price, of 0:99, suggests an approximately
proportional supply response by the dominant domestic producer to price. The stability charac-
teristics of the model, as reported in summary form in Figure 3, are such as to render the model
the presence of levels variables that are partially integrated - such as the market share and duties variables. For this
reason, sensitivity results to the inclusion or exclusion of these dimensions reported below assume some importance.
We reject the possibility of more cointegrating relations that have structural meaning on theoretical grounds.
38An alternative way to interpret this ￿nding is as follows: In light of our theoretical exposition, the negative sign
for import duties suggests that the products are strategic compliments (demand is su¢ ciently convex). In this case,
higher import duties, by lowering imports, will induce the domestic ￿rm to reduce supply to the domestic market.
20robust.39 We conclude that the best estimate of the price elasticity of demand in the LDPE market
is approximately ￿0:3.
"Insert Figure 3 about here."
"Insert Table 2 about here."
"Insert Table 3 about here."
Given the similarities between LDPE and LLDPE markets, we proceed to ￿nal speci￿cation of
the LLDPE model directly. As the ￿rst speci￿cation we employ the base model given by equations
(29 & 30), but modi￿ed in order to exclude exports, since exports for the LLDPE market are
stationary. In Table 2 we report results for the maximal eigenvalue and trace test statistics on
the number of cointegrating relations in the system. The maximal eigenvalue and test statistics
con￿rm the presence of two cointegrating relations at the 5% level, and the trace statistic of
three cointegrating vectors. Given our theoretical priors, we proceed on the assumption of two
cointegrating vectors.
In Model 2 of Table 3 we estimate the system of two equations (29 & 30), but excluding the
market share variable.40 Demand for LLDPE responds negatively to price with an elasticity of
￿0:7, con￿rming the feasibility of j"q;pj < 1 outlined in the theoretical discussion of section 3.1.2.
The income elasticity of demand is positive, at 0:2, while an increase in imports results in demand
growth. Thus rising import competitiveness, generates a growth in domestic market size. This
is intuitive. An increase in imports, other things being equal, raises the aggregate supply in the
domestic market and hence drives the equilibrium price down. This increases the size of the market
as consumers who formally did not a⁄ord to purchase the good can now participate in the market.
In addition, existing consumers can a⁄ord to buy more at the lower prices. However, the elasticity
39To test the results of our LDPE model for robustness, we tested the sensitivity of results to the additional
exclusion of the urbanization rate, the price elasticity of supply, as well as the variables that are likely only partially
integrated, market share and duties. We also consider the impact of relaxing the assumption that @c=@q ! 0. Results
prove robust to the exclusion of the urbanization rate, and the possibility that variable costs are not material to the
supply decision in the domestic market. A zero restriction on the price elasticity of supply leaves results unchanged,
with the exception of lowering the income elasticity of demand from approximately 0:8 to approximately 0:2 ￿ 0:3.
Exclusion of the two variables that are likely partially integrated in levels terms, viz. market share and the duties
variables, either by zero-restricting the variables in the long run, or both the long and the short run, renders the price
elasticity of demand positive in estimation - lending credence to our prior modelling decision of including the variables
in the long run speci￿cation of the model. Relaxing the @c=@q ! 0 assumption proves to carry strong implications for
estimated results on the supply side of the market. The price elasticity of demand is signi￿cantly lowered to ￿0:10,
and demand comes to respond negatively to urbanization. Results on the supply side of the market are rendered
completely theoretically incoherent by relaxing the @c=@q ! 0 assumption. Speci￿cally, supply responds negatively
to price (elasticity of ￿8:77), positively to input costs (elasticity of ￿4:96), positively to an increase in import duties
(with a one percentage point decrease in duties reducing market size by approximately 43%), and positively to an
increase in exports (elasticity of 0:27). These results are implausible not only because of their sign, but because of
their magnitude. Given these results there is little option but to reject the model incorporating variable costs in
estimation. Full results are available from the authors on request.
40Inclusion of the market share variable invariably renders it insigni￿cant in estimation.
21is relatively small, at 0:06. Demand responds positively to urbanization, such that a one percentage
point increase in urbanization increases LLDPE demand by 0:11%. Supply responds positively to
price with an elasticity of 0:42, and negatively to input costs with an elasticity of ￿0:27. Finally,
output supply responds negatively to an increase in import duties. Again, the sign is theoretically
coherent. However, the magnitude of the impact is implausibly large (a one percentage point
increase in duties reduces market size by approximately 8.7%).
"Insert Figure 4 about here."
In conclusion, although model 2 carries considerable theoretical coherence (signs of the estimated
parameters are as one would expect), the data doesn￿ t seem to support this model very well. In
particular, the supply is poorly described. Of the three estimated coe¢ cients, only one (import
duties) proves to be signi￿cant, but the magnitude of the impact appears implausibly large. The
price and input cost variables prove to be insigni￿cant in the supply relation.41 In Figure 4 we
report the stability characteristics of Model 2, which proves acceptable. We conclude that the best
estimate of the price elasticity of demand in the LLDPE market is approximately ￿0:7.
Given the univariate time series characteristics of the data for the PVC market, we cannot
proceed by utilizing equations (29 & 30) as the base model. As noted in the data section, the import
variable for the PVC market proves to be stationary, as is the market share of the historically large
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(32)
In Model 3, reported in Table 3, we estimate equations (31 & 32) directly, imposing the full
restrictions suggested by the theoretical discussion of section (3.1.1). In particular, we impose
￿12 = 1;￿26 = 0.42 We impose no weak exogeneity conditions on the estimation, In Table 2 we
report results for the maximal eigenvalue and trace test statistics on the number of cointegrating
41We again tested extensively for the robustness of our results. Of particular interest are the robustness of Model 1
to additional zero restrictions on input costs and the market price in the supply relation. All parameter values in the
model remain robust in terms of sign, in terms of statistical and in terms of economic signi￿cance to the additional
zero restrictions. Full results are available form the authors.
42If we don￿ t restrict the price elasticity of demand and the marginal cost, the PVC model gives incoherent estimates
(see footnote 45).
22relations in the system. The maximal eigenvalue and trace test statistics con￿rm the presence of
two cointegrating relations at the 10% and 5% levels respectively.
Demand for PVC responds negatively to price with an elasticity of ￿1:00, by assumption.
The magnitude, such that j"q;pj = 1, is consistent with the presence of monopoly power for the
domestic producer in the PVC market, in the absence of variable costs of production, as outlined
in section (3.1.1) of the paper. The income elasticity of demand is positive, at 0:88. Demand
responds positively to urbanization, with a one percentage point increase in the urbanization rate
raising demand by 0:07%. Output supply responds positively to price with an elasticity of 0:13,
and negatively to an increase in exports. The impact is statistically signi￿cant, and the ￿nding
is of an elasticity of 0:03. Given the understanding of the drivers of the export decision in the
petrochemicals markets, as outlined in the introduction of the paper, the expectation would be
that exports are a diversion of part of the output intended for the domestic market to foreign
markets. The estimated coe¢ cient is therefore plausible. Finally, output supply responds positively
to an increase in import duties. This is as one would generally expect in quantity competition.
Reaction functions are typically downward sloping implying the goods are strategic substitutes.
In this case, an increase in tari⁄s should induce the HLDP to increase its supply in the domestic
market. However, the implied impact is both small economically (a one percentage point decrease
in duties decreases market size by 0:004%), and statistically insigni￿cant.
Figure 5 reports stability characteristics of the model - which prove adequate. Model 3 is thus
theoretically and statistically coherent, and constitutes our preferred model for the PVC market.43
However, given that the demand elasticity (of unity) is imposed, caution should be exercised when
interpreting the results of the PVC model.
"Insert Figure 5 about here."
The PP market di⁄ers from the others explored in this study, since the demand faced by the
historically large domestic producer has to be separated from that for the market as a whole,
and indeed that faced by the historically large domestic producer￿ s domestic competitor. Thus
the demand and supply relations are both speci￿ed in terms of the historically large domestic
43To test the robustness of our results, we removed the zero-restriction on the variable cost in production to the
supply decision in the domestic market. While demand-side determinants continued to report theoretically coherent
coe¢ cients, the supply side of the market did not. Speci￿cally, supply responds negatively to price (elasticity of
￿1:65), positively to input costs (elasticity of 1:68), and positively to an increase in exports. All three ￿ndings are
theoretically incoherent. We also estimate equations (31 & 32) without the zero restriction on variable cost, as well
as leaving the price elasticity of demand free. Under this speci￿cation we have a higher price elasticity of demand
(￿1:70), but also a very high income elasticity of demand (3:49). Further, the price elasticity of supply is both
implausibly large in economic terms (elasticity of ￿3:66), and is of the wrong sign. The same is true of the supply
response to inputs costs (positive elasticity of 3:99), while the positive elasticity of supply with respect to exports
(0:13) again does not correspond to the view of exports as vent for surplus outlined in the introduction.
These ￿ndings left us with no choice but to restrict the price elasticity of demand to unity and to zero-restrict
variable costs in production for the PVC market.
23producer￿ s production for the domestic market. Ideally, in the demand relation the price of the
domestic competitor should be treated as the price of a substitute, while in the supply relation it
might serve as a strategic interaction term for the historically large domestic producer￿ s production
decision.
However, given the market description for PP, and the linking of the cost structure of the
domestic competitor to the historically large domestic producer￿ s output price, there has to be
an anticipation that the historically large domestic producer￿ s prices may be linked to that of its
domestic competitor. Indeed, the two prices prove to be cointegrated, such that the addition of
the domestic competitor price into estimation adds little additional information over and above the
historically large domestic producer￿ s own price.
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(34)
where we anticipate two cointegrating relations, LQ denotes the natural log of the historically large
domestic producer￿ s domestic sales, and LPS the natural log of the historically large domestic
producer￿ s prices for the domestic market respectively. LPExports denotes the natural log of
export prices.
In Table 2 we report the maximal eigenvalue and trace statistics for our base speci￿cation of
eight variables. Note that the trace statistics con￿rms the presence of two cointegrating relations.
In Model 4, reported in Table 3, we estimate equations (33 & 34) directly. We impose no weak
exogeneity conditions on the estimation. The price elasticity of demand is ￿0:21, which is not
inconsistent with the theoretical framework of section 3.1.3. Income elasticity of demand is 1:16,
and demand also responds positively to urbanization, such that a one percentage point increase in
the urbanization rate will increase PP demand by 0:08%. The historically large domestic producer￿ s
PP supply responds positively to its own price, with an elasticity of 5:36 - where the positive response
is plausible, though of surprising strength. The supply response to input costs reports an elasticity
of approximately ￿0:32. Finally, the historically large domestic producer￿ s supply response to an
increase in exports is negative (elasticity of 3:39), consistent with the expectation that exports are
a switch of domestic output from domestic markets to foreign markets. The estimated coe¢ cient
is therefore of plausible sign, though the strength of the response is surprising.
In conclusion, Model 4 for PP is theoretically coherent. The price elasticity of demand for
24the historically large domestic producer￿ s PP output is negative, and is below unity as rendered
plausible by the associated theory. The positive income elasticity of demand for the historically large
domestic producer￿ s PP output is strong, and the price elasticity of the historically large domestic
producer￿ s PP production is surprisingly large. Figure 6 reports the stability characteristics of the
model respectively, which prove adequate. We conclude that the price elasticity of demand in the
PP market is ￿0:21.
"Insert Figure 6 about here."
5 Conclusions and Evaluation
This paper has examined whether there necessarily exists a con￿ ict between allocative and produc-
tive e¢ ciency in small open economy markets.
Analysis focused on the speci￿c case of petrochemicals derived plastics in an emerging market
economy. Empirical characterization of the four markets under consideration allowed us to explore
the impact of alternative market structures on market behaviour. Starting point of the analysis was
that signi￿cant economies of scale in production favoured a small number of domestic producers.
That productive e¢ ciency favours market concentration is thus not in dispute, and the sole question
we face is whether allocative e¢ ciency su⁄ers under high market concentration. We proceed both
theoretically, as well as econometrically.
A number of conclusions follow from the analysis.
First, we ￿nd that the con￿ ict between productive and allocative e¢ ciency is not necessarily
as stringent as the international competition policy literature suggests should be the case. In
particular, we note that the strategic interaction between the large domestic producer and its
competitors makes feasible a range of alternative price elasticities of demand. Empirically, in the
South African markets we ￿nd that price elasticities of demand are low (less than or equal to unity
in absolute terms). While low price elasticities in general imply the presence of pricing power,
we note that the impact of market structure in these four markets is such as to render feasible
a wide range of possible levels of pricing power. It follows that the con￿ ict between productive
and allocative e¢ ciency is not only not a necessary feature of small open economies, but this is so
because high degrees of market concentration and low price elasticities of demand do not necessarily
translate into pricing power.
Second, the price elasticities of demand for low density polyethylene (LDPE), linear low density
polyethylene (LLDPE) and polypropylene (PP) are found to be -0.3, -0.7, and -0.2 respectively,
while that for poly(vinyl chloride) (PVC) is 1 by construction. Howevr, as pointed out in the
paper, the elasticity values of -0.7 for the linear low density polyethylene (LLDPE) and -1 for the
poly(vinyl chloride) (PVC) should be interpreted with caution.
Third, the impact of market structure is crucial, making precise microeconomic analysis of any
25market vital in any application of competition policy. Thus in the poly(vinyl chloride) (PVC)
evidence suggests the presence of some pricing power on the part of the historically large domestic
producer, while the evidence for the low density polyethylene (LDPE), and linear low density
polyethylene (LLDPE) is considerably more ambiguous. Finally, the duopoly structure of the
polypropylene (PP) market is such as to suggest both domestic producers can a⁄ect the market
price - but it is not clear which of the two has the greater capacity to do so, and indeed that the
market outcome is not e¢ cient in the allocative sense.
The policy conclusion which follows is that competition policy cannot take the con￿ ict between
allocative and productive e¢ ciency for granted. Instead, analysis has to proceed on the basis of
detailed microeconomic evidence on a case by case basis.
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Table 1: ADF test statistics with drift, but without trend, * denotes rejection of the null of 
stationarity at the 5 percent level. 
 LDPE LLDPE PVC  PP 
Variable ~I (0)  ~I (1)  ~I (0)  ~I (1)  ~I (0)  ~I (1)  ~I (0)  ~I (1) 
LQ  -0.99 -4.36*  -1.78 -4.05*  -1.04 -12.59* -1.11 -6.44* 
LPricept -0.91 -10.33*  -0.50 -8.05*  -1.39 -11.33* -1.10 -10.20*
LIncome  -2.01 -4.16*  -2.01 -4.16*  -2.01 -4.16*  -2.01 -4.16* 
LInput 
Tot 
0.40  -7.36* -1.71  -5.61* -1.45  -4.58* -2.17  -12.02*
MktSir  -4.64* -0.54* -2.68  -12.38* -3.95* -6.26* -1.03  -6.17* 
CU1  -3.02* -5.01* -3.36* -5.59* -7.91* -6.68* n/a  na/a 
LExports -2.74  -6.28* -4.30* -9.85* -2.24  -16.55* -3.81* -11.42*
LPExports  -1.39  -7.97* -2.98* -6.29* -2.76  -5.26* -1.51  -13.71*
LImports  -1.71 -11.10*  -1.72 -11.05* -3.29*  -11.90* -1.53 -11.81*
LPImports  -0.91 -10.33*  -0.50 -8.05*  -1.56 -8.91*  -1.10 -10.20*
Duties  -2.30 -11.42*  -2.30 -11.42* -0.51 -4.21*  No  vat.  No  vat. 
Urban  1.77 -11.20*  1.77 -11.20* 1.77 -11.20* 1.77 -11.20*




Table 2: Maximal Eigenvalue and Trace Test Statistics 
  LDPE  LLDPE  PVC  PP 





































r = 0  r  =  1  99.59* 66.31* 219.47* 57.09* 153.04* 72.93* 152.94*
r  ≤ 1  r = 2  61.29*  48.98*  153.16* 39.00** 95.95*  32.18  80.02* 
r ≤ 2  r  =  3 41.60 35.63 104.18* 23.05 56.95 24.66 47.84 
r ≤ 3  r  =  4 36.81 28.54 68.55 19.10 33.90 13.16 23.18 
r ≤ 4  r = 5  24.69  22.50  40.01  7.69  14.79  7.92  10.02 
r ≤ 5  r = 6  19.25  11.04  17.51  4.73  7.10  2.10  2.10 
r ≤ 6  r  =  7  13.47  6.37 6.47 2.37 2.37    
r ≤ 7  r = 8  9.40  0.10  0.10         
r ≤ 8  r  =  9  0.85E-4        
* indicates rejection of null at 5% level 
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Table 3: LDPE Estimation Results 
 LDPE LLDPE PVC  PP 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
  β  β  β  β 
































































0.00 0.00  0.27 
(0.28) 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.32 
(0.06) 
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Figure 6: Impulse responses: Stability Characteristics: PVC Model 4. 
 
 
 
 
36